under
Ronald Reagan 1981-89
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Alexander Haig 1981-82 Haig was White House Chief of Staff in the Nixon Administration. Wesley Clark was a speech writer for Haig: [1] George Shultz 1982-89 |
PNAC Signatory Caspar W. Weinberger 1981-87
Asst: Frank C. Carlucci 1987-89 |
William Casey 1981-87 William Webster 1987-89 |
PNAC Signatory Richard Allen 1981-82 William Clark 1982-83 Robert McFarlane 1983-85 John Poindexter 1985-86 GW Bush Adm Frank Carlucci 1986-87 Colin Powell 1987-89 GW Bush Adm |
William French Smith 1981-85 PNAC Signatory Edwin Meese III 1985-88 PNAC Signatory Richard Thornburgh 1988-1991 |
David C. Jones 1978-82 John W. Vessey, Jr. 1982-85 William J. Crowe 1985-89 |
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• Sec of Treasury -- Donald T. Regan 1981-85 James A. Baker, III 1985-88 Nicholas F. Brady 1988-89 • Sec of Interior -- James G. Watt 1981-83, William P. Clark 1983-85, Donald P. Hodel 1985-89, • Sec of Agriculture -- John R. Block 1981-86 Richard E. Lyng 1986-89 • Sec of Commerce -- Malcolm Baldrige 1981-87, C. William Verity 1987-89 • Sec of Labor -- Raymond J. Donovan 1981-85 William Brock 1985-87 Ann Dore McLaughlin 1987-89 • Sec Health & Human Services -- Richard S. Schweiker 1981-83 Margaret M. Heckler 1983-85 Otis R. Bowen 1985-89 • Sec Education -- Terrel H. Bell 1981-85 PNAC Signatory William J. Bennett 1985-88 Lauro F. Cavazos, Jr. 1988-89 • Sec Housing & Urban Dev -- Samuel R. Pierce, Jr 1981-89 • Sec Transportation -- Andrew L. Lewis, Jr. 1981-83 Elizabeth H. Dole (1983-87) James H. Burnley 1987-89 • Sec of Energy -- James B. Edwards 1981-82 Donald P. Hodel 1982-85 John Herrington 1985-89 |
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Who's Who in Iran-Contra, list from: [1] "At Least 19 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) MEMBERS were involved inthe Iran-Contra Affair":
GATES, ROBERT CIA Deputy Director.
General Richard Secord is veteran of the CIA secret war in Laos.[2]
Also involved: |
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notes:
American's first 'war on terror':
The hallmark of Reagan Administration foreign policy was a return to the Containment Militarism
of 1950. It would be the Cold War revisited, but with a twist:
Although, during the Carter years 'human rights and arms control characterized more the
style than the actual substance of foreign policy', it was a policy that was deeply threatening
to the hawkish idealogy of the Reaganites and needed to be discredited:
Raising the specter of terrorism serves multiple purposes. First, people who perceive themselves to be in immanent danger of attacks by terrorists are less likely to be distracted by loss of their own civil rights or by moral concerns about the manner in which they treat others. As a result, fewer constraints will beimposed on foreign policy decision-making.
Secondly, it is a handy tool for reframing existing foreign policy so as to make it publicly acceptable.
The definition of terrorism can easily be expanded to identify, as enemies, peoples for whom it has
become 'necessary ...to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them' -
i.e., genuine revolutionaries. To saddle such persons with the label of 'terrorist' is an attempt to pull the moral ground out from under causes - like freedom and democracy - which are legitimate causes.
Thirdly, military campaigns gain tremendous flexibility - as we are now seeing under George W Bush - by
invoking an image of an enemy who presumably does not respect national boundaries. Freedom to coordinate
and conduct multiple theaters of war in several sovereign lands simultaneously can be easily achieved only
when there is no compunction about ignoring national borders, at will, unprovoked by the
nation-state whose border it is. This strategem [related to the concept of 'asymmetric threats' - see GWB Administration/asymmetric], used in combination with the flexibility that is achieved when 'pre-emptive' military strike is perceived as a legitimate military option,
leaves the imperialist impulse nearly unfettered.
Thirty two members of the Reagan Administration (six of whom are now PNAC signatories were members of CPD-II (The Committee on the Present Danger). For a list of their names, see [2]
Perle, who got his start in government as a protege of Nitze's, gained a ruthless reputation as the man behind Henry Jackson's decade-long, no-holds-barred assault on detente and arms control. Perle's nominal superior at the Pentagon is PNAC signatory Fred Ikle, another member of the CPF who became the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency after a Jackson-Perle purge of the agency in revenge for SALT I. - Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), page 342
Douglas Feith, who serves in the George W. Bush administration as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the third ranking civilian position at the Pentagon, 'served on the White House National Security staff under Richard Allen during Ronald Reagan's first term in office. He was dismissed when Judge William Clark replaced Allen. Allegations of improperly handling classified materials were made but Feith was not prosecuted. During Reagan's second term in office, Feith was part of Richard N. Perle's Pentagon team'.[1]
Many in the Reagan Administration were also members of the Council on Foreign Relations:
Under Reagan, an expansion of the intelligence community is followed by public distrust:
1987 - Public support for the CIA plummets with the Iran-contra scandal, involving the illegal sale of arms to Iran to fund the agency's secret support of anti-government rebels in Nicaragua."[5]
Woolsey and nuclear weapons:
During Ronald Reagan's administration he served on a missile-basing advisory panel, on Brent Scowcroft [National
Security Advisor under Ford, 1975-77]'s Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, on a defense management blue ribbon panel, and as a U.S. delegate to negotiations on space arms and on conventional forces in Europe. With Scowcroft, Woolsey wrote a series of opinion pieces supporting aspects of Reagan administration defense policies. As national security adviser under President George Bush [1989-93], Scowcroft tried to install Woolsey as the sparkplug for an interagency policy review of strategic issues, National Security Review 12 (NSR-12). [7]
Reagan was pushing 'limited' strategic use of nuclear weapons:
The suspicion was brought home quite vividly in the macabre plans unveiled by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency for mass evacuations from U.S. cities under the guise of civil defense. The agency declared that 'the United States could survive nuclear attack and go on to recovery within a few years'. - Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), page 330
The following, from Group Watch:[8]
Board of Trustees included: Henry A. Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger
Advisory Board included: PNAC signatoryRichard Cheney & James Woolsey, Sen. William Cohen [Secretary of Defense under Clinton], Sen. Albert Gore, William French Smith, attorney general in the Reagan administration
Notable senior advisers: Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of the CIA [under Kennedy and Johnson: 1962-66, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence; 1966-73, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the Department of State Director of State Department Intelligence]
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a right-wing, neoconservative think tank which was founded in 1962. Ray S. Cline was a cofounder. (36) Until 1986, CSIS was affiliated with Georgetown University. (2) Its first fulltime staff member was PNAC signatory Richard V. Allen, a conservative Republican who was President Reagan's first National Security Adviser. (2) CSIS describes itself as "an independent insitution for public policy research in the field of foreign and national security affairs. " It focuses on "the issues and challenges that confront the United States in advancing its global interests and discharging its global responsibilities. "(1) It claims to be a nonpartisan institution of international, interdisciplinary scholars." "However, Timothy S. Healy, president of Georgetown University, examined its affiliate and decided that CSIS was academically somewhat less credible than it claimed to be. Apparently, CSIS has no library, its faculty are seen more often on television than in the classroom (over 4,000 appearances in 1985), and its publications have a reputation (by academic standards) of being superficial. (2) CSIS has been called "a parking lot for former government big shots," and a "conservative propaganda machine," particularly for the policies of the Reagan administration. (2) Most CSIS senior fellows do not teach classes, but do draw handsome salaries (up to $70,000).
The formal affiliation between Georgetown and CSIS ended on July 1, 1987. (1) An article in the London Tribune quotes a Washington Post article saying that Georgetown severed the relationship because of the strong identification CSIS had with the Reagan administration on arms control, Central America, and South Africa. The University was also disturbed because large contributions to CSIS come from some of the biggest defense contractors." Funding: "Between 1973 and 1981, Richard Scaife, who is a member of the CSIS advisory board, donated $5. 3 million to CSIS" ...The CSIS focus on national security and "advancing the global interests" of the U. S. made it a favorite of the Reagan administration. The center specializes in studies of crisis management, with an emphasis on how the U. S. should manage crises in other countries. There is little question that it influenced policy during the Reagan administration
... Ray Cline was a founding member of the Committee on the Present Danger, an anti-Soviet group that promoted the policy of containment militarism.[9]
CSIS produces a large volume of books and reports in the areas of defense, economics and energy, governance, national and international security, refugee policy, and regional studies
But investigations of America's secret war in Nicaragua have revealed mounting evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency has been fighting the Contra war with the help of international drug traffickers.[10]
Regarding the numerous felons from the Reagan era that George W Bush has appointed to his administration, and
the 'October Surprise' incident (in which George HW Bush is believed to have personally played a role):
The reasons for the attacks on Americans in Iran and Lebanon in 1979 [during the Carter Administration] and throughout the 1980s were largely unknown to most Americans, allowing politicians and pundits with little understanding of the histories of those countries to disseminate highly simplified, if not ridiculous, explanations of their import. Articles and books explaining that shi`a Muslims had a propensity for violence and terrorism proliferated. Sensationalist writers described a global terror network based in the Soviet Union and the linkage between "communist totalitarianism and Islamic (and Arab) radicalism." Some scholars joined this band wagon. A new field of "terrorology" emerged, with its own journals, conferences, and research institutes. This popular and scholarly literature informed the discourse of the first American "war on terrorism" during the mid-1980s.[1]
After his confirmation as secretary of state, on the occasion of his first news conference, Alexander Haig again stressed linkage as the centerpiece of the Reagan foreign policy, this time adding the provocative charge that the Soviet Union was 'training, funding and equipping international terrorism.' Expounding on this alarming thesis, the new secretary went on to allege in his distinctively peculiar syntax, that the Soviets 'today are involved in a conscious poicy, in programs if you will, which foster, support and expand this activity which is hemorrhaging in many respects around the world today.' Finally, to further establish the tone and direction for the coming months, Haig explained that 'international terrorism' would take the place of 'human rights' in the Administration's foreign policy. -Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), page 291
Given Reagan's goals, it was not enough to dismiss these concerns in the everyday conduct of policy: they had to be devalued as desirable ends as well. That is to say, a policy built on the support of
repressive dictatorships that suppress human rights, cannot hold up human rights as a worthy
benchmark for judging that policy. Similarly, if the cornerstone of foreign policy rests on remilitarization,
then arms control must be deemphasized to the same degree. - Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), page 305
Behind the terrorism accusation one finds again at work the heavy hand of the CPD [Committee on the Present Danger]. Richard Pipes, by this time touted as the 'reigning White House Soviet scholar', had developed the thesis that while the Soviet Union 'will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons... as part of a global ideology' it 'encourages and employs terrorism because terrorism is a handy and relatively cheap weapon in their arsenal to destroy Western societies.' Pipes' proof would add a bizarre chapter even to a John Birch Society anthology. He argues:
The roots of Soviet terrorism, indeed of modern terrorism date back to 1879, when
an organization called 'The People's Will' was created in a small Russian town, Lipetsk. This small
band of political assassins, which, among other things, murdered Czaar Alexander II, is the true source of all modern terrorist groups whether they be named the Tupamaros, the Baador-Meinhof group,
the Weathermean, Red Brigade or PLO.
[Those who the CPD] relied upon to to draft the position papers at Defense and the National Security Council
had been handpicked from the ranks of the CPD by PNAC signatory Richard Allen and William Van Cleave
before their departure from the Administration. In this group were ambitious hardliners like PNAC signatory Richard Perle, who was named to the important post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, a position known as the Pentagon's 'little State Department' because it encompasses the gamut of policy from relations with the Soviet Union, NATO and Europe, to economic and strategic issues.
Reagan's National Security was made up of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) George P. Schultz, CFR/T Henry Kissinger, CFR William Casey, CFR/T Casper Weinberger,
and CFR Gen. David Jones with David Rockefeller (Chairman of CFR/T) being an unofficial advisor".[3]
In 1973 (during the Nixon Administration) David Rockefeller was a founding member of the Trilateral Commission (T) - it feared the spread of democracy in the U.S. and sought to brainstorm methods to address the problem. Noam Chomsky: [4]
1980s - The intelligence community expands as a result of President Ronald Reagan's campaign to “rearm America.”
Early in Reagan's presidency, Woolsey and Scowcroft championed the notion of a new small ICBM missile soon dubbed Midgetman. A year later, the small ICBM idea suddenly became the centerpiece of then-Sen. Albert Gore's campaign for a nuclear "build down." A probable intermediary for this notion was then-Cong. Les Aspin
Aspin would later become Defense Secretary in the Clinton Administration. He was
a Wisconsin Democrat, friend and tennis partner of R. James Woolsey, CIA Director under Clinton
from 1993 to 95.[6] Woolsey's exposure to intelligence came through his law partner Anthony A. Lapham, general counsel to the CIA from 1976 to 1979, in the Ford Administration under George H.W. Bush - who "played a key role in heading off legislation resulting from congressional desires to rein in the intelligence community, specifically the Intelligence Reform and Reorganization bill presented in 1978. It would have provided a detailed charter for the CIA and other community components." Woolsey served in the Carter Administration as Undersecretary of the Navy.
Woolsey's real expertise lies in the area of nuclear and strategic forces. He got his start as a program analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he served for two years in the late 1960s. He was assigned to the National Security Council staff for a short period during which he was an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). This job, his first after Yale Law School, prepared Woolsey for work from 1970 to 1973 as counsel to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Like the people of Europe, an increasing number of Americans had reached the conclusion that Reagan was preparing to fight a nuclear war - one that would surely involve strategic intercontinental
exchanges, as well as theater strikes 'limited' to Europe.
1987-88: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
From a PBS show, "Guns, Drugs and the Cia", Judy Woodruff:
Two of the most persistent offensives of the Reagan presidency have been the war against communism in Central America and the war on drugs here at home.
... the Reagan-Bush campaign makes secret pact with Iran to delay release of the Embassy hostages until after the November election, in return for future covert arms sales.
[11]
The Rest of the Iceberg
